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BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling that the 
reasonable doubt instruction given in this case violated this Court's "constitutionally flawed" 
three-part test. State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, \ 22, 84 P.3d 841 (addendum A).1 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Is this Court's three-part test governing reasonable doubt instructions 
"constitutionally flawed," as the court of appeals unanimously concluded? 
1
 This Court also granted defendant's cross-petition challenging the court of appeals' 
holding that refusing to repeat certain instructions at the close of evidence was harmless 
error. The State will respond to defendant's argument on that issue in its Brief of Cross-
Respondent. 
On a writ of certiorari, this Court will "review the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference." Newspaper Agency Corp. v. 
Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The question presented does not require this Court to interpret any constitutional 
provisions, statutes, or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information dated 24 March 2002 with aggravated sexual 
assault, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405 (1999). R. 6-8. The 
information was later amended to include a second count of aggravated sexual assault. R. 
34-36. 
A jury found defendant guilty on both counts. R. 184-86. He was sentenced to two 
concurrent terms of 15 years to life. R. 197-98. Defendant timely appealed. R. 203-04. 
This Court transferred the case to the court of appeals, which reversed and remanded. R. 
225; Reyes, 2004 UT App 8. The State petitioned for certiorari to challenge the court of 
appeals' ruling that the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case violated the United 
States Constitution. Defendant cross-petitioned for certiorari to challenge the court of 
appeals' ruling that the timing of the jury instructions, though erroneous, was harmless. This 
Court granted both petitions. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On Valentine's Day 2002, Ashley and three friends went to Bricks, a Salt Lake City 
dance club. R. 229: 20-21. About an hour and a half after arriving, Ashley stepped outside 
because she was expecting a phone call from her boyfriend. R. 229: 21-22. She was 
wearing a tank top and black leather pants and feeling "kind of tipsy" from some tequila she 
had consumed earlier. R. 229: 22. 
Defendant drove up, waved Ashley over, and said, "Come here." R. 229: 23-25,46-
47. He was not a typical Bricks patron: his head was shaved, and he was wearing a 
"hoodie."3 R. 229: 25, 71, 74. Ashley walked over and said, "Can I bum a cigarette?" R. 
229:47. He said, "Yeah, come around to the passenger side." R. 229: 26. Ashley walked 
around to the passenger side and sat down in the car, but left the door open and let her feet 
"dangle out." R. 229: 26, 74. She had no intention of going anywhere. R. 229: 26. 
Defendant started driving away, so Ashley put her feet in and shut the door. 
Defendant said he had no cigarettes, but would go to a gas station and buy her some. R. 229: 
27. As they drove, the two told each other their names and ages. R. 229: 27. Ashley was 
18; defendant, who is 40, said he was 26. R. 229: 28-29, 149. They did not discuss sex. R. 
229: 44, 51. Ashley does not speak Spanish, but defendant, who spoke in broken English, 
"definitely knew enough to communicate." R. 229: 28, 47. 
2
 Except as otherwise noted, the facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah 1993). 
3
 A "hoodie" is a hooded sweatshirt. 
3 
Ashley directed defendant to a nearby 7-Eleven. R. 229: 28. When they were about 
halfway there, she received a call from her boyfriend. R. 229: 28, 52. When they got to the 
store, Ashley told defendant to get Camel Lights, and he went in to buy them. R. 229: 29. 
After he got back into the car, Ashley, who was starting to get nervous, asked, "Are we going 
back to Bricks now?" Defendant said, "Yeah." R. 229: 29. 
On the way back to Bricks, defendant stopped the car in an alley near the railroad 
tracks. R. 229: 32. A factory, warehouses, and a loading dock were in the area. R. 229: 32. 
No other cars were around. R. 229: 33. Ashley was still on the phone with her boyfriend. 
R. 229: 34. Defendant got out of the car. R. 229: 34. He opened her door, pulled out a 
knife, and held it to her stomach. R. 229: 35, 129. The blade was six to eight inches long, 
and an inch or an inch and a half wide. R. 229: 35. He grabbed the phone and threw it on 
the ground, breaking it. R. 229: 35. 
Defendant motioned Ashley out of the car; she obeyed. R. 229:36. He "started trying 
to take off [her] belt" and then started "motioning [her] to take [her] pants down." R. 229: 
36. Ashley started taking off her pants, but defendant "ended up . . . ripping them down." 
R. 229: 36-37. He pulled her pants and underpants down around her ankles. R. 229: 37. 
Ashley "was like crying, kind of," asking him "why he was doing it," and "telling him to 
stop." R. 229: 36-37. Defendant said only, "shut up." R. 229: 38. 
Defendant pulled his own pants down and touched Ashley's vagina with his fingers. 
"He just kind of—he kind of tried to put them in a little bit and was feeling around." R. 229: 
4 
39. He turned her around, bent her over the car, and penetrated her "a little bit" with his 
penis. R. 229:38-40. Defendant then got back in the car and drove away. The entire episode 
lasted three to four minutes. R. 229: 40. 
Ashley pulled up her pants. She picked up her phone, put it back together, called her 
boyfriend, and told him what happened. R. 229: 41, 59. Ashley was "hysterical" or "in 
shock," "crying and freaking out." R. 229: 65, 133, 59. He told her to calm down and get 
back to the club, because she was "like hyperventilating." R. 229: 65. He said, "Walk back 
to Bricks, walk back to Bricks, find a cop." R. 229: 42. It was a four-block walk on a cold 
night without a coat; Ashley "wasn't really thinking about that, though." R. 229: 43. 
When Ashley arrived at Bricks, a security guard there noticed that she "looked like 
she had been in a scuffle." R. 229: 75. She was "very visibly upset": "[v]ery upset, very 
shaken, very red, bloodshot eyes, she had been crying"; she had the appearance of someone 
who "had been through something traumatic." R. 229: 85. She did not want to talk and she 
was cold. R. 229: 76. Ashley told the guard that she had been raped. R. 229: 77. 
Defendant spoke with police. When asked if he thought it was okay to have sex with 
Ashley, he responded, "She said no." R. 229: 93. However, defendant claimed that because 
the car door was open and she did not leave, she wanted to have sex with him. R. 229: 93-
94. When asked why he did this, defendant answered "that the reason that [he] went out and 
had sex that night was because [he] was married with children and [he] had a hard time 
sleeping." R. 229: 154. 
5 
Defendant gave his version of events at trial. He testified that Ashley had mentioned 
sex, and so, after parking the car, he got out and said, "You like sexo?" R. 229:141,144-45. 
He testified that she first said "no," but he asked her again and "that's when she said okay, 
okay" and started pulling her pants down. R. 229: 145-46. She asked him if he preferred 
inside or outside the car, and he told her outside; "that's when we had that moment." R. 229: 
146-47. Defendant denied using the knife. R. 229: 147, 157. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should overrule State v. Robertson's three-part test. It meets all the criteria 
announced in Menzies for overruling precedent: the test was devised without considering all 
relevant authority, a majority of this Court adopted it without analysis, and the test does not 
work well—in fact, reasonable doubt cases have largely ignored or criticized it. But the 
test's most salient flaw is that it misstates the constitutional standard. The United States 
Supreme Court has been clear that, so long as the trial court instructs the jury that the 
defendant must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, trial courts need not use any 
particular form of words or even define reasonable doubt at all. 
In any event, the instruction given here was sound. It satisfied all requirements of the 




DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS IS CONSTITUTIONALLY FLAWED AND 
SHOULD BE OVERRULED 
Defendant argued in the court of appeals that the trial court's "instruction defining 
reasonable doubt was defective because it did not require the State to' obviate' all reasonable 
doubt and it erroneously stated that reasonable doubt was not merely a 'possibility.'" Br. 
Aplt. at 13. Accordingly, defendant argued, it violated his "due process and jury trial rights" 
and, as "structural error," required reversal. Id. at 13, 16.4 
The court of appeals held that "[t]he reasonable doubt instruction that the trial court 
gave to the jury clearly did not comport with the first and third prongs of the three-part test 
as announced in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f^ 25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 
TJ 30. Although the court concluded that "Robertson is not consistent with United States 
Supreme Court precedent," it nevertheless reversed and remanded for a new trial, noting that 
"this court does not have the authority to overrule Robertson." Id. 
This Court does have the authority to overrule Robertson and should do so. 
A. The three-part test should be overruled. 
The three-part test first appeared in a majority opinion in State v. Robertson: 
4
 "Defendant never argued, either at trial or on appeal, that his rights under the Utah 
Constitution had been violated." State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, \ 14, n.2. 
7 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's 
proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Ireland, 173 P.2d at 
1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Second, the instruction should 
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or 
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an 
instruction1 tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict. 
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Third, "it is inappropriate to 
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility," 
although it is permissible to instruct that a "fanciful or wholly 
speculative possibility ought not to d efeat proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. at 1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232. This portion of Robertson should be overruled. 
Stare decisis imposes on those seeking to overturn prior precedent "a substantial 
burden of persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. 
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,427 (Utah 1986)), cert, denied 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). An American 
court of last resort "will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless 
clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent." 
Id. at 399 (quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Rev. 
367, 367 (1957)). In overruling Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the 
Menzies Court noted three flaws in Justice Ellett's opinion: (1) he "not only failed to explain 
why he was abandoning the long-established Hopt rule, but failed to cite that line of cases 
altogether"; (2) he adopted a new rule "with little analysis and without reference to 
authority"; and (3) his rule "does not work very well." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400 
8 
(citations omitted). Robertson's three-prong test suffers from each of these shortcomings. 
In addition, it misstates the constitutional standard. 
1. The three-part test was devised without considering relevant 
authority. 
The three-part test announced in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), 
overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98,125, n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000, 
originated in a 1989 dissent in State v. Ireland, 713 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989). By 1989, the 
Supreme Court of Utah and the Supreme Court of the United States had produced a line of 
cases analyzing reasonable doubt instructions. These cases discussed such issues as "weighty 
affairs" language and "possible or imaginary" doubts. The Ireland dissent not only failed to 
explain its departure from these cases, it "failed to cite that line of cases altogether." 
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399. 
Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430 (1887), is a United States Supreme Court case 
originating in the Territory of Utah. Hopt attacked a reasonable doubt instruction that 
instructed the jury that if "you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the 
defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and 
important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt." Id at 439. 
The Supreme Court approved the language, calling it "as just a guide to practical men as can 
well be given; and if it were open to criticism, it could not have misled the jury" when read 
in the context of the entire instruction. Id. at 441. 
9 
State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541, 65 P. 494 (1901), involved an attack on "weighty affairs" 
language in a reasonable doubt instruction materially identical to that approved in Hopt. 65 
P. at 495. This Court held that it was very probable that the "weighty affairs" language 
"would, if standing alone, have been of questionable sufficiency, yet, whether correct or not, 
it could do no harm with the aid of, and in connection with, other parts of that and other 
instructions given on that subject." Id. The Court cautioned against delving into subtleties 
requiring "a trained classical mind": 
Jurors are presumed to have common sense, and to understand the English 
language, and if they cannot understand their duty when instructed that they 
should not convict when they have a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt, 
or of any fact necessary to prove it, they will seldom get any assistance from 
such subtleties as require a trained classical mind to distinguish. 
Id 
In Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), the Supreme Court expressed 
discomfort with an instruction comparing reasonable doubt to "the kind of doubt.. . which 
you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be willing to act 
upon." Id. at 138. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that "the instruction as given was not 
of the type that could mislead the jury into finding no reasonable doubt when in fact there 
was some." Id. 
In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), this Court rejected a 
sufficiency challenge to a burglary conviction. In describing proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, this Court stated, "Where circumstances otherwise strongly suggest guilt, the doubt 
10 
should be real and substantial and not one that is merely possible or imaginary." 6 Utah 2d 
at 114,307 P.2d at 215. It continued, "All that is required is that the jurors have an abiding 
conviction of the defendant's guilt such as they would be willing to act upon in the more 
weighty and important matters relating to their own affairs." Id. 
In State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985), this Court reviewed a conviction for 
issuing bad checks. In the course of rejecting McClain's claim that she was entitled to a 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction, the court found no reason to suppose that the 
jury "gave undue weight to the evidence by being instructed that reasonable doubt 'is not 
mere possible doubt, but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more 
weighty affairs of life . . . Doubt to be reasonable must be actual and substantial, not mere 
possibility or speculation.'" Id. at 606. 
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), this Court affirmed Tillman's 
conviction and death sentence. It reviewed a challenge to a jury instruction containing 
"weighty and important matters" and "possible doubt" language: 
But if after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the evidence 
you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's 
guilt such as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and 
important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. 
A reasonable doubt must be real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely 
possible or imaginary. 
M a t 573. A unanimous court approved the instruction. Id. It acknowledged the difficulty 
of defining reasonable doubt, but held that "defendant has not come close to a showing of 
11 
a denial of due process because of the language used at his trial." Id. at 573, 577, 582, 583, 
591. 
This was the state of the law in 1989, when State v. Ireland reached this Court. 
Ireland challenged a reasonable doubt instruction containing "weighty affairs" and "mere 
possibility" language: 
A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt, but 
is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs 
of life. If the mind of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration 
of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an 
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. 
Doubt to be reasonable must be actual and substantial, not mere possibility or 
speculation. 
Ireland, 113 P.2d at 1379-80. Because this instruction was "almost identical" to the 
instruction approved in Tillman, a majority of the court rejected Ireland's challenge. Id. at 
1380. 
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that "the instruction defining proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt was erroneous." Id. at 1380. His dissenting opinion leveled three 
criticisms at the instruction. First, the instruction equated proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
with "an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge." Id. at 1381. Without citation to 
authority, the dissent declared, "That is not the law." Id. Rather, "the instruction should 
specifically state that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Id. Second, the 
dissent asserted that "it is not proper to instruct a jury that a reasonable doubt is one which 
'would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life.'" Id. Finally, the 
12 
dissent asserted "that it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a 
possibility." Id. at 1382. 
The Ireland dissent ignored at least five controlling cases—Hopt, Neel, Sullivan, 
McClain, and Tillman—that had approved reasonable doubt instructions containing the very 
elements the dissent described as "clearly erroneous." Id. The dissent did cite Holland v. 
United States. See id. at 1381, n.l. However, it did so as if Holland supported the dissent. 
In fact, Holland held that a reasonable doubt instruction "correctly conveyed the concept of 
reasonable doubt" despite equating reasonable doubt with the kind of doubt jurors might be 
willing to act upon in their more serious and important affairs. Holland, 348 U.S. at 138. 
The dissent made no attempt to reconcile this holding with its assertion that such an 
instruction is "not proper." 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Despite the dissent's failure to analyze or even acknowledge controlling case law, the 
majority wrote approvingly of its conclusions, and even invoked the Court's "supervisory 
capacity" to direct trial courts to comply with two of the three requirements: 
We do acknowledge, however, that the dissent's criticisms of the "more 
weighty affairs of life" language is justified and share Justice Stewart's 
concern that the "possible or imaginary" language might, by implication, be 
understood to diminish the prosecution's standard of proof. Therefore, in our 
supervisory capacity, we direct the trial courts to discontinue use of that 
language in their instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 13 80. Other than relying on Tillman, the majority made no reference to 
the case law cited above. 
13 
2. A majority of this Court adopted the Ireland dissent without 
analysis and without reference to authority. 
The following week, Justice Stewart picked up two votes. In State v. Johnson, 114 
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), the reasonable doubt instruction contained the "weighty affairs" 
language condemned in the Ireland dissent. Id. at 1146. However, Johnson did not 
challenge that instruction; he argued rather that the trial court should have supplemented its 
reasonable doubt instruction with his proposed instruction. The lead opinion, which 
represented only two justices, rejected Johnson's claim that the trial court erred in not giving 
his "redundant or repetitive" proposed supplemental instruction. Id. These justices saw no 
need for it where the jury was instructed "that they must acquit unless each and every element 
is established by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. . ." Id. 
Justice Stewart concurred in the result. Id. at 1147. His opinion criticized the 
reasonable doubt instruction actually given in the case as incorrect, yet concluded that its 
flaws "do not rise to the level of reversible error." Id. at 1148. The opinion spoke favorably 
of Johnson's proposed instruction, although it hardly embodied the principles espoused in 
his Ireland dissent. 
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion quoted the portion of Johnson's proposed 
supplemental instruction stating that reasonable doubt "is not mere possible doubt . . . It is 
the state of the case which after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the 
evidence leaves the mind[s] of the Jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an 
abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge." Id. (omission in original). 
14 
Ironically, this excerpt from Johnson's proposed instruction contains the very "abiding 
conviction" language that Justice Stewart had in Ireland declared was "not the law." Ireland, 
113 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Johnson's instruction also states that reasonable 
doubt "is not mere possible doubt," yet the Ireland dissent declared it "inappropriate to 
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility." Id. at 1382. Finally, Johnson's 
proposed instruction does not state that "the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt," 
as required by the Ireland dissent. See id. In short, Johnson's proposed instruction violated 
every stricture of the Ireland dissent except one (it contained no "weighty affairs" language). 
Yet Justice Stewart's concurrence concluded that, while Johnson's proposed instruction "also 
leaves something to be desired, it comes closer to conveying the essential meaning of the 
legal concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
Two justices joined this concurrence, effectively making it the majority opinion on 
this point. See id. at 1149. No justice noted the contradiction between the 
Johnson concurrence and the Ireland dissent, and no justice analyzed or even acknowledged 
the long line of controlling authority cited above. 
Four years later, the Ireland dissent, through Johnson, was cited in a majority opinion 
of this Court. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993). Young attacked a reasonable 
doubt instruction that stated, "[Y]ou must have greater assurance of the correctness of such 
a decision than you would normally have in reaching the weighty decisions affecting your 
own life." Id. at 346. Citing Justice Stewart's Johnson concurrence, the Court rejected 
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Young's challenge on the ground that the instruction "impressed upon the jurors that the 
reasonable doubt standard requires greater proof than such decisions." Id. The Court added, 
"No talismanic phraseology is required to articulate the reasonable doubt standard. An 
instruction must merely impress upon the jurors the heavy burden the prosecution must meet 
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. No justice dissented from this portion of the 
opinion. 
However, m State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1232 (Utah 1997), the Ireland dissent 
hardened into a test. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Zimmerman observed that in 
Johnson a majority of the court had "essentially adopted" the Ireland dissent, which he 
proceeded to distill into a "three-part test": 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's 
proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Ireland, 173 P.2d at 
1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Second, the instruction should 
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or 
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an 
instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict. 
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Third, "it is inappropriate to 
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility," 
although it is permissible to instruct that a "fanciful or wholly 
speculative p ossibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. at 1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232. The instruction at issue in Robertson "met all three tests." Id. 
In the case at bar, defendant argued in the court of appeals that this three-part test is 
constitutional in nature and thus "defines the test for determining the constitutionality of 
reasonable doubt instructions in Utah . . ." Reply at 2-3, 7. The court of appeals agreed. 
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See Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ffif 14, 14 n.2, 16-22. Thus did a dissent with "weak analytical 
underpinnings" metamorphose, "with little analysis and without reference to authority," into 
a three-part constitutional test. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400. 
3. The three-part test does not work well. 
In addition to its "weak analytical underpinnings," Robertson's three-part test "does 
not work very well," as demonstrated by its subsequent history. Id. Since Robertson, Utah 
courts have decided three cases challenging reasonable doubt instructions: one affirmed 
without analysis on the ground that the instruction at issue was identical to the Robertson 
instruction, one ignored Robertson altogether, and one—the court of appeals here—applied 
but criticized the three-part test. 
The first is State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999). It involved a 
challenge to the same instruction the Court had just upheld in Robertson. The instruction 
was accordingly upheld without discussion. Id. at \ 40. 
The second is Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 44 P.3d 626. Carter argued that his 
appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge a reasonable doubt instruction 
stating that "[a] reasonable doubt must be a real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely 
possible or imaginary." Id. at ^ 51. Ignoring Robertson altogether, this Court found "no 
constitutional deficiency in the instruction." Id. 
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The third is State v. Reyes, the case at bar. The court of appeals reluctantly applied 
Robertson's three-part test as a matter of stare decisis despite concluding that it "is not 
consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, f^ 30. 
4. The three-part test misstates the constitutional standard. 
The court of appeals was correct. While the three-part test suffers from "weak 
analytical underpinnings" and "does not work very well," Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400, its 
most salient flaw is that it misstates the constitutional standard. 
"[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The burden of proof rests upon the 
government. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,210 (1977); Lelandv. Oregon, 343 U.S. 
790, 795 (1952). The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases is 
"bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict 
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
However, "the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable 
doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 
(1994) (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1887)). "Indeed, so long as the court 
instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising 
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the jury of the government's burden of proof." Id. (citations omitted). "The constitutional 
question . . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the 
instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." 
Id. at 6. 
All three prongs of the three-part test misapply these principles. The first prong 
declares that "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must obviate all 
reasonable doubt." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citation omitted). This directly contradicts 
Victor, which states that "the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words 
be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." Victor, 511 U.S. at 5.5 
Though not at issue here, the second prong of the test also misstates the constitutional 
standard. The second prong forbids stating "that a reasonable doubt is one which 'would 
5
 Even if some form of words were required, it is far from clear that obviate is the best 
choice. Obviate means "To prevent by anticipating" or "make unnecessary." THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY at 861 (2d college ed. 1991). Pennsylvania is the only other 
American jurisdiction to use the term as Ireland does. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 718 
A.2d 768, 773 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. DJ.A, 800 A.2d 965, 974 (Pa. Super. 2002). 
Cf. Gray v. Nether land, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (stating that "it violated due process for 
a jury instruction to obviate the requirement that the prosecutor prove all the elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt"). One Utah district judge recently recounted his 
experience with the word: 
Judges are timid about changing "approved" instructions. The bravest I have 
been with this particular [reasonable doubt] instruction is to change the word 
"obviate" to "eliminate," because when I first saw it, I didn't know what 
"obviate" meant, and no jurors I asked in two straight felony trials knew what 
it meant. 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite, Real World Descriptions of Legal Terms, Utah Bar Journal, 
Vol. 16, No. 2 (March 2003) p.32. 
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govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life,' as such an instruction tends 
to trivialize the decision of whether to convict." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citation 
omitted). Although such formulations are "strongly disfavored," Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 
1116, 1126 (10th Cir. 2000), the United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly approved" 
them. Victor, 511 U.S. at 20; see also id. at 18 ("'Reasonable doubt' is such a doubt as 
would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important 
transactions of life, to pause and hesitate..."); Holland, 348 U.S. at 140 ("the kind of doubt 
. . . which you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be 
willing to act upon"); see also Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d at 1123 ("if... you have an abiding 
conviction of the defendant's guilt such as you would be willing to act upon in the more 
weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt"); 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 573 (same). 
Robertson's third prong also misstates the constitutional requirement. It holds that 
"it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility." Robertson, 
932 P.2d at 1232 (citation omitted). Again, this directly contradicts Victor. In Victor, one 
of the defendants objected "to the portion of the charge in which the judge instructed the jury 
that a reasonable doubt is 'not a mere possible doubt.'" Victor, 511 U.S. at 17. The United 
States Supreme Court rejected the challenge. Id. at 17. Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court, 
without citing Robertson, found no constitutional deficiency in an instruction that 
distinguished a reasonable doubt from "one that is merely possible or imaginary." Carter v. 
Galetka, 2001 UT 96, If 51, 44 P.3d 626 (citing Victor, 511 U.S. at 19-20). 
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To the extent Robertson purports to graft technical requirements onto the established 
constitutional test for reasonable doubt instructions, it should be overruled as unnecessary 
and incorrect. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398-400. 
B. The reasonable doubt instruction given here satisfies both the 
Constitution and the three-part test. 
The reasonable doubt instruction given here was proper. The trial court addressed the 
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt in Instruction no. 15: 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of 
innocence. A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Where you are satisfied that a reasonable doubt exists as to 
a defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to acquittal. 
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require 
proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which 
is merely possible, since everything in human affairs is open to some possible 
or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that 
satisfies your mind and convinces your conscientious understanding. 
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men and women and 
arises from the evidence, or lack of evidence, in the case. 
R. 165 (addendum B). This instruction exceeds constitutional requirements and satisfies the 
three-part test. 
1. The reasonable doubt instruction satisfies constitutional 
requirements. 
The absence of any reference to "obviating" all reasonable doubt does not render the 
instruction constitutionally infirm. As noted above, "so long as the court instructs the jury 
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on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury 
of the government's burden of proof." Victor, 511 U.S. at 5. 
There is no "reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow 
conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the [beyond a reasonable doubt] standard." 
Id at 6. The jury was instructed that "[a] defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Where you are satisfied that a reasonable doubt exists as to a 
defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to acquittal. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 165. Moreover, Instruction no. 14 
instructed the jury that "[t]he presumption of innocence must prevail unless and until you are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. The defendant is entitled 
to acquittal where there is reasonable doubt as to his/her guilt." R. 164. 
The "mere possibility" language in Instruction no. 15 does not offend the Due Process 
Clause. In Carter v. Galetka, this Court found "no constitutional deficiency" in the 
following language from a reasonable doubt instruction: "[a] reasonable doubt must be a real, 
substantial doubt and not one that is merely possible or imaginary." 2001 UT 96, ^ f 51 (citing 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5). In Victor v. Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court approved a 
reasonable doubt instruction containing similar language: 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; 
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral 
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. 
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511 U.S. at 7 (emphasis omitted). This instruction was challenged on the ground that it 
instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt is "not a mere possible doubt." 511 U.S. at 17. 
The Court noted that "[a] fanciful doubt is not a reasonable doubt." Id. "That this is the 
sense in which the instruction uses 'possible' is made clear from the final phrase of the 
sentence, which notes that everything is open to some possible or imaginary doubt." Id. 
The portion of Instruction no. 15 challenged here is indistinguishable from those 
approved by the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court: 
Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which is merely possible, since 
everything in human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. . . 
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men and women and 
arises from the evidence, or lack of evidence, in the case. 
R. 165 (addendum B) (challenged portion emphasized). Like the Carter and Victor 
instructions, this instruction contrasts reasonable doubt arising from the evidence with 
"merely possible doubt," meaning, in context, "imaginary" doubt, or, in Ireland's parlance, 
"fanciful or wholly speculative" doubt. 773 P.2d at 1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
It thus created no "reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to 
allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the [reasonable doubt] standard." 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 6. Nothing more is required. 
2. The reasonable doubt instruction satisfies Robertson's three-part 
test. 
In the event this Court determines that the Robertson three-part test is an appropriate 
expression of the constitutional standard or is otherwise binding upon trial courts in this state, 
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it should still reverse the court of appeals. Without analysis, the court of appeals declared 
that "the trial court's reasonable doubt jury instruction failed to comport with the 
requirements of the three-part test set forth in Robertson and constituted a structural error 
requiring reversal." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, f 22. In fact, the instruction satisfied the three-
part test and, to any extent it did not, any error was harmless. 
First, the trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution was required to eliminate 
all reasonable doubt. Defendant claimed that the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction 
"never required the State to obviate all reasonable doubt." Br. Aplt. at 14. However, the trial 
court instructed the jury that "[a] defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Where you are satisfied that a reasonable doubt exists as to a 
defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to acquittal. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 165 (emphasis added). Moreover, Jury 
Instruction no. 14, "Presumption of Innocence," instructed the jury that "[t]he presumption 
of innocence must prevail unless and until you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
guilt of the defendant. The defendant is entitled to acquittal where there is reasonable doubt 
as to his/her guilt." R. 164. 
These instructions informed the jury of the prosecution's burden of proving 
defendant's guilt, and that, if a reasonable doubt remained, they must acquit. Nothing more 
is required. That the reasonable doubt instruction did not include the word obviate is of no 
moment. "No talismanic phraseology is required to articulate the reasonable doubt standard." 
Young, 853 P.2d at 346. 
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Second, the court's reasonable doubt instruction properly distinguished between a 
"reasonable doubt" and an "imaginary doubt." It drew a clear line between "doubt 
entertained by reasonable men and women and aris[ing] from the evidence, or lack of 
evidence, in the case" and "possible or imaginary doubt" or doubt that is "merely possible": 
Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which is merely possible, since 
everything in human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. . . 
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men and women and 
arises from the evidence, or lack of evidence, in the case. 
R. 165 (addendum B). Defendant asserted that Instruction no. 15 "erroneously 
communicated to the jury that a possibility may never constitute a reasonable doubt." Br. 
Aplt. at 15-16. On the contrary, even a juror with a "trained classical mind" could not have 
teased out of this instruction the rule that a possible doubt cannot be a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' order reversing defendant's 
conviction. It should also do expressly what it did implicitly in Carter, repudiate the 
Robertson three-part test as incorrect and unnecessary. 
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Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
William Barrett, J., of aggravated sexual assault, 
and he appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., 
held that: 
(l)trial court's "reasonable doubt" instruction 
which failed to require the State to obviate all 
reasonable doubt and incorrectly stated that 
reasonable doubt was not doubt which was merely 
possible constituted a structural error requiring 
reversal; 
(2) trial court erred when, at the end of the trial, it 
failed to reinstruct the jury on the law as it related to 
defendant's fundamental rights, given rule 
mandating that trial court instruct the jury at the 
close of evidence; and 
(3) court's error was harmless. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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f 1 Defendant, German Cruz Reyes, appeals his 
conviction of two counts of aggravated sexual 
assault, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated section 76-5-405 (Supp.2002). 
Specifically, Defendant argues that this court should 
reverse and remand for a new trial because (1) the 
trial court violated Defendant's due process and jury 
trial rights when it misstated the law in the jury 
instruction defining reasonable doubt, and (2) the 
trial court violated Utah law and Defendant's due 
process right to a fair trial when it failed to instruct 
the jury on the law at the close of evidence. We 
reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
If' 2 On the evening of February 14, 2002, the 
victim, an eighteen-year-old female, went to Bricks 
nightclub in Salt Lake City, Utah, to go dancing. At 
approximately midnight, she went outside the club 
to wait for her boyfriend to call her on her cellular 
phone. Because the victim had consumed a few 
shots of tequila, she was feeling "kind of tipsy" at 
the time. 
U 3 While the victim was waiting for her 
boyfriend's call, Defendant drove up to the front of 
the nightclub and motioned for the victim to 
approach his car. The victim walked over to 
Defendant and asked him for a cigarette. Defendant 
instructed the victim to walk around to the 
passenger side of his car. The victim got into 
Defendant's car but left the passenger door open 
with her feet hanging outside the car. Defendant 
then started to drive away and the victim put her 
feet inside the car and closed the door. 
TJ 4 Defendant told the victim that he was taking 
her to a gas station to buy cigarettes. On the way to 
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buy the cigarettes, Defendant and the victim spoke 
very little because Defendant did not speak English 
very well. Their conversation was limited to 
exchanging their names and ages. According to the 
victim, Defendant told her he was twenty-six. In 
fact, Defendant was approximately forty-years-old 
at the time. 
T[ 5 When they were about halfway to a nearby 
7-Eleven convenience store, the victim's boyfriend 
called her on her cellular phone. When Defendant 
and the victim arrived at the 7-Eleven, Defendant 
bought cigarettes while the victim continued to 
speak on the phone with her boyfriend. However, 
*844 the victim never informed her boyfriend that 
she was in Defendant's car. 
|^ 6 When Defendant got back in the car, the 
victim, who was starting to feel nervous, asked 
Defendant if they were going back to the nightclub. 
Defendant told her that they were. On the way 
back, Defendant stopped the car in an alley located 
in an industrial area several blocks from Bricks 
nightclub. While the victim was still on the phone to 
her boyfriend, Defendant got out of the car and 
opened the rear passenger door and started to look 
for something on the floor behind the victim's seat. 
Defendant then opened the front passenger door and 
started to search the area around the victim's feet. 
The victim shut the passenger door and Defendant 
continued his search in the back seat. According to 
the victim, Defendant then opened her door again, 
held a knife to her stomach, and threw her phone to 
the ground, causing it to break into pieces. Next, 
Defendant made the victim get out of the car and 
forced her to pull her pants down. The victim 
started to cry and asked Defendant to stop. 
Moments later, Defendant pulled his own pants 
down and proceeded to penetrate the victim's vagina 
with his fingers. Defendant then turned the victim 
around and slightly penetrated the victim's vagina 
with his penis. The entire incident lasted about 
three or four minutes. Defendant then got back in 
his car and drove away. 
If 7 After Defendant left, the victim dressed, put 
her phone back together, and called her boyfriend 
and informed him that she had just been raped. She 
then walked back to the nightclub and told a friend 
what had happened. The friend located a security 
guard who observed that the victim appeared to 
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have been recently involved ' in a scuffle" 
According to the security guard, the victim's clothes 
appeared "tattered," her hair was "messed up," and 
she was crying and very emotional When the 
security guard asked the victim if she had been 
raped, she answered "yes " 
Tf 8 During Defendant's trial, he admitted he had 
engaged in sexual relations with the victim, but 
claimed she had consented According to 
Defendant, he asked the victim if she liked "sexo," 
and while she initially answered "no," the second 
time he asked the question, she said "yes" 
Defendant further claimed the victim exited his car 
of her own accord and he and the victim then "tried 
to have sex" Defendant denied using a knife to 
force Defendant to have sex with him 
| 9 On March 21, 2002, the State filed an 
information chargmg Defendant with one count of 
aggravated assault During Defendant's preliminary 
hearing, the victim testified that Defendant had 
penetrated her vagina using his fingers, an 
allegation that the State had not known previously 
Based on this new allegation, the trial court allowed 
the State to add a second count of aggravated sexual 
assault to the information 
H 10 Defendant's trial began on October 31, 2002 
Prior to opening statements, the trial court 
proposed reading the jury eighteen preliminary 
instructions These instructions included 
instructions on the presumption of innocence and on 
the definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
Defense counsel objected to the trial court giving 
the jury these preliminary instructions without also 
rereading the instructions at the end of the trial The 
basis for the objection was that instructing the jury 
m this manner violated Utah law and Defendant's 
due process rights 
If 11 Defense counsel also objected to the wording 
of the trial court's proposed jury instruction defining 
reasonable doubt That instruction read as follows 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are m favor of innocence A defendant 
is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt Where you are satisfied that a 
reasonable doubt exists as to a defendant's guilt, 
he/she is entitled to acquittal 
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the 
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defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require 
proof to an absolute certainty Reasonable doubt 
is required, not doubt which is merely possible, 
since everything in human affairs is open to some 
possible or imaginary doubt Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that 
satisfies your mind and convinces your 
conscientious understandmg *845 Reasonable 
doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men and 
women and arises from the evidence, or lack of 
evidence, in the case 
Defense counsel claimed that this instruction was 
improper because it did not meet the requirements 
of the three-part test announced by the Utah 
Supreme Court m State v Robertson, 932 P 2d 
1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by 
State v Weeks, 2002 UT 98,U 25 n 11, 61 P 3d 
1000 Specifically, defense counsel argued that 
under Robertson, the instruction was required to 
contain the phrase "proof beyond reasonable doubt 
obviates all reasonable doubt" and could not 
contain the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot merely 
be a possibility" 
\ 12 The trial court overruled both of defense 
counsel's objections and proceeded to read the jury 
eighteen preliminary instructions Each juror was 
given a written copy of these preliminary 
instructions The following day, immediately prior 
to closing arguments, the trial court read the jury 
the remaining fourteen instructions [FN1] Agam, 
each juror was provided with a written copy of 
these additional instructions 
FN1 These fourteen instructions did not 
include an instruction on Defendant's 
presumption of innocence or on the 
definition of reasonable doubt 
1f 13 After deliberating for approximately four 
hours, the jury found Defendant guilty on both 
counts The trial court sentenced Defendant to two 
concurrent terms of fifteen years to life Defendant 
timely filed his notice of appeal 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] ^ 14 Defendant argues that the trial court 
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violated his "due process and jury trial nghts" under 
the United States Constitution [FN2] because the 
trial court's jury instruction defining reasonable 
doubt did not require the State to " 'obviate' all 
reasonable doubt" and erroneously stated that 
"reasonable doubt is not doubt which is merely 
possible " "Whether [a jury] instruction correctly 
states the law is reviewable under a correction of 
error standard, with no particular deference given to 
the trial court's ruling" State v Archuleta, 850 
P 2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted) 
FN2 Although at the beginning of his brief 
Defendant cites to Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution (guaranteeing that 
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law") and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution (guaranteeing criminal 
defendants "the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury"), 
Defendant never argued, either at trial or 
on appeal, that his rights under the Utah 
Constitution had been violated Therefore, 
we only address Defendant's constitutional 
claims that arise under the United States 
Constitution See State v Seale, 853 P 2d 
862, 873 n 6 (Utah 1993) (noting that 
when party fails to make separate 
argument under state constitutional 
provision, his or her claim will only be 
addressed under federal constitution) 
[2] K 15 Defendant further argues that when the 
trial court failed to reread the preliminary jury 
instructions at the close of evidence, it violated 
Utah law and his due process right to a fair trial 
Determining the propriety of the mstructions 
submitted to the jury presents a question of law, 
which we review for correctness See Ames v Maas, 
846 P 2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
ANALYSIS 
I Jury Instruction Defining Reasonable Doubt 
[3] [4] [5] [6] % 16 Defendant argues that the trial 
court violated his due process and jury trial rights 
because it failed to adequately instruct the jury on 
the definition of reasonable doubt Specifically, 
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Defendant claims that the trial court's jury 
instruction on reasonable doubt was 
unconstitutional because the instruction failed to 
require the State to " 'obviate' all reasonable doubt" 
and incorrectly stated that "reasonable doubt is 
not doubt which is merely possible " "[T]he Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged" In re Winship, 397 U S 
358, 364, 90 S Ct 1068, 1073, 25 LEd2d 368 
(1970) (emphasis added) "This 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement applies 
in state as well as federal proceedings" *846 
Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 U S 275, 278, 113 S Ct 
2078, 2080-81, 124 LEd2d 182 (1993) (citation 
omitted) In addition, "the Fifth Amendment [due 
process] requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a 
jury verdict are interrelated" so that "the jury 
verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury 
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" Id at 
278, 113 SCt at 2081 "Denial of the right to a 
jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" 
qualifies as "structural error," thereby requiring 
reversal Id at 281-82, 113 S Ct at 2083 
[7][8] K 17 Although "[t]he beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is a requirement of due process, 
the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from 
defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do 
so as a matter of course " Victor v Nebraska, 511 
U S 1, 5, 114 SCt 1239, 1243, 127 LEd2d 583 
(1994) (citation omitted) "[S]o long as the court 
instructs the jury on the necessity that the 
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used in advising the 
jury of the government's burden of proof" Id, 114 
S Ct at 1243 (citations omitted) 
% 18 In Victor, the United States Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of two reasonable 
doubt jury instructions One of these mstructions 
defined reasonable doubt m part as follows " 'It is 
not a mere possible doubt, because everything 
relatmg to human affairs is open to some possible 
or imaginary doubt' " [FN3] Id at 7, 114 SCt at 
1244 The Court concluded that this definition of 
reasonable doubt was constitutional See id at 17, 
114 SCt at 1248-49 
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FN3. The definition of reasonable doubt at 
issue in this case used almost identical 
language. It stated: "Reasonable doubt is 
required, not doubt which is merely 
possible, since everything in human affairs 
is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt." 
Tf 19 Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Victor 
and its initial determination that no particular 
words are required when instructing the jury on the 
government's burden of proof, the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 
1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Weeks, 2002 UT 98,H 25 n. 11, 61 P.3d 1000, 
without mentioning Victor, explained that it had 
"essentially adopted the analysis of Justice Stewart's 
dissent in State v. Ireland, ITS P.2d 1375, 1380-82 
(Utah 1989), for reviewing the appropriateness of a 
reasonable doubt instruction." Robertson, 932 P.2d 
at 1232. According to our supreme court, this 
analysis required the following three-part test: 
First, "the instruction should specifically state 
that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable 
doubt." Second, the instruction should not state 
that a reasonable doubt is one which "would 
govern or control a person in the more weighty 
affairs of life," as such instruction tends to 
trivialize the decision of whether to convict. 
Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a 
reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility," 
although it is permissible to instruct that a 
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought 
not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, under 
Robertson, the trial court's jury instruction on 
reasonable doubt was improper because it stated 
that "reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which 
is merely possible" and it failed to mention that the 
State's burden of proof "must obviate all reasonable 
doubt." Id. (citations omitted). 
If 20 The State attempts to diminish the 
significance of the three-part test in Robertson by 
arguing that the test is not based on any 
constitutional authority. First, the State claims that 
the first prong of the test is inconsistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's determination that a 
reasonable doubt instruction does not require any 
particular form of words. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 
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114 S.Ct. at 1243. Second, the State claims that the 
third prong of the test misstates the standard for 
analyzing the constitutionality of a reasonable doubt 
instruction because "mere possibility" language was 
approved by the United States Supreme Court, see 
id. at 17, 114 S.Ct. at 1248-49, and by the Utah 
Supreme Court. See Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 
1f 51, 44 P.3d 626. Accordingly, in its brief, the 
State asks this court to overrule Robertson, and 
during oral argument, the State went so far as to 
suggest *847 that Carter had effectively overruled 
Robertson. 
If 21 Although we agree that Victor cannot be 
reconciled with the three-part test in Robertson, we 
simply do not have the authority to overrule 
Robertson. Only the Utah Supreme Court can 
correct any deficiencies in Robertson. See Sentry 
Investigations v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992) ("The Court of Appeals simply 
cannot overrule the law as announced by the highest 
court in the state...."). Moreover, while it is true 
that in Carter the Utah Supreme Court found "no 
constitutional deficiency" in a reasonable doubt jury 
instruction that stated "a reasonable doubt must be a 
real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely 
possible or imaginary," Carter, 2001 UT 96 at \ 
51, 44 P.3d 626, we do not agree with the State's 
claim that this meant that Robertson had been 
effectively overruled. The reason that the Carter 
court upheld the reasonable doubt instruction at 
issue was because a similar jury instruction that 
contained the term "substantial doubt" had been 
previously deemed constitutional by the United 
States Supreme Court. [FN4] See id. at % 51 n. 4. 
More importantly, when analyzing the reasonable 
doubt instruction in Carter, the court did not 
reference Robertson or its three-part test. 
Therefore, we may not infer that when the court 
held that the challenged reasonable doubt jury 
instruction was constitutional, it was overruling 
Robertson. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
398-99 (Utah 1994) (noting that under the principle 
of stare decisis, a court of last resort " 'will follow 
the rule of law which it has established in earlier 
cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because 
of changing conditions and that more good than 
harm will come by departing from precedent' " 
(citation omitted)). 
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FN4. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court 
reviewed two sets of reasonable doubt jury 
instructions in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 
(1994). One instruction was challenged 
based on reasonable doubt being defined 
in part as " ynot a mere possible doubV " 
See id. at 7, 114 S.Ct. at 1244. The other 
instruction was challenged based on 
reasonable doubt being defined in part as 
an " x actual and substantial doubV " See id. 
at 18, 114 S.Ct. at 1249. It was the latter 
instruction which provided the basis for 
the court's decision to uphold the 
reasonable doubt instruction at issue in 
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 44 P.3d 
626. See id. at1J5ln. 4. 
If 22 In this case, it is clear that the trial court's 
reasonable doubt jury instruction failed to comport 
with the requirements of the three-part test set forth 
in Robertson and constituted a structural error 
requiring reversal. Although this test may be 
constitutionally flawed, it is not within our power to 
overrule it. Accordingly, on this issue, we reverse 
and remand for a new trial. 
II. Failure To Reinstruct The Jury 
[9] K 23 Defendant also argues that when the trial 
court failed to reread all of the preliminary jury 
instructions at the close of evidence, it violated rule 
17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and his due process right to a fair trial. "We 
interpret a [court] rule by examining the rule's plain 
language and resort[ ] to other methods ... only if 
the language is ambiguous." State v. 
Quinonez-Gaiton, 2002 UT App 273,^ [ 11, 54 P.3d 
139 (second and third alterations in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Rule 17(g) 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the 
trial shall proceed in the following order: 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any 
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the 
jury; 
Utah R.Crim. P. 17(g)(6) (emphasis added). 
If 24 The plain language of this rule indicates that 
a trial court must instruct the jury at the close of 
evidence. Although the trial court is also required 
to instruct the jury at "any other appropriate time," 
we do not construe this to mean, as the State 
contends, that a trial court can adhere to the rule by 
giving the jury some of its instructions before 
opening statements (an "appropriate time") and the 
rest of its instructions before closing arguments 
("[w]hen the evidence is concluded"). Utah 
R.Crim. P. 17(g)(6). The *848 use of the mandatory 
word "shall" along with the conjunction "and" 
demonstrates that such an interpretation is not 
plausible. Id. Were we to accept the State's 
argument, a trial court could comply with rule 
17(g)(6) by reading all but one of the jury 
instructions at the beginning of the trial and save 
one remaining instruction for after the close of 
evidence; a result clearly not allowed by the 
drafters of the rule. 
1f 25 The State also argues that because rule 19(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly 
allows a trial court to provide the jury with 
preliminary instructions prior to opening statements, 
[FN5] the trial court in this case was not required to 
repeat these instructions to the jury after the close of 
evidence. Again, we find the State's argument 
unpersuasive. In State v. Marquez, 135 Ariz. 316, 
660 P.2d 1243 (Ct.App.1983), the court considered 
whether the trial court erred when it instructed the 
jury on the State's burden of proof at the opening of 
the trial but failed to do so after the close of 
evidence. See id. at 1247. As part of its analysis, 
the court examined Arizona Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 18.6(c), which contains language similar 
to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(a). Rule 
18.6(c) states: " 'Immediately after the jury is 
sworn, the court shall instruct the jury concerning 
its duties, its conduct, the order of proceedings, and 
the elementary legal principles that will govern 
proceedings.' " Marquez, 660 P.2d at 1248 (citation 
omitted). The court interpreted this rule as follows: 
FN5. Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
After the jury is sworn and before opening 
statements, the court may instruct the jury 
concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, 
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the order of proceedings, the elements and 
burden of proof for the alleged crime, and 
the definition of terms The court may 
instruct the jury concerning any matter 
the court in its discretion believes will 
assist the jurors m comprehending the 
case 
In order that there be no further confusion, we 
hold that the preliminary instruction of the jury, 
authorized by Rule 18 6(c), Rules of Cnmmal 
Procedure, is for the purpose of preparing the 
jury for the trial and constitutes an orientation 
process by which the jury is made to understand 
its duties and responsibilities Where elementary 
legal principles that will govern the proceedings 
are given to the jury as a part of the orientation, 
the trial judge must repeat all such legal 
principles in its charge to the jury, where such 
legal principles mclude matters of law vital to the 
rights of a defendant 
Id at 1249, see also State v Comen, 50 Ohio 
St 3d 206, 553 N E 2d 640, 644 (1990) (noting that 
"[i]f the preliminary or cautionary instructions 
include matters of law vital to the rights of a 
defendant, the trial court is not excused from 
including or repeating all such instructions after the 
arguments are completed") 
[10][11][12] \ 26 Like Arizona's rule 18 6(c), 
Utah's rule 19(a) permits a trial court to provide 
jurors, as part of their orientation, with preliminary 
instructions on matters that the court "believes will 
assist the jurors in comprehending the case " Utah 
RCnm P 19(a) Although the rule authorizes a 
trial court to instruct the jury not only on procedural 
matters but also on matters relating to the 
fundamental rights of a defendant, such as "the 
elements and burden of proof for the alleged 
crime," id, it does not supercede the plain and 
unambiguous mandate contained m rule 17(g)(6) 
that the jury be instructed at the close of evidence 
In other words, while it is permissible, and we 
believe appropriate, for a trial court to provide the 
jury with preliminary instructions on "matters of 
law vital to the rights of a defendant," Marquez, 660 
P 2d at 1249, such as the presumption of innocence 
and the State's burden of proof, in order to fully 
comply with rule 17(g)(6), the court must repeat 
these instructions at the close of evidence [FN6] Id 
Accordmgly, we hold *849 that the trial court erred 
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when, at the end of the trial, it failed to reinstruct 
the jury on the law as it related to Defendant's 
fundamental nghts [FN7] 
FN6 We note that requiring a trial court to 
reinstruct the jury at the end of the trial is 
consistent with the approach taken by 
courts in other jurisdictions that have 
interpreted rules similar to rule 17(g)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure See 
eg, State v Jackson, 144 Ariz 53, 695 
P2d 742, 743 (1985) (concluding that trial 
court is required, under Arizona Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to "instruct the jury at 
end of evidence and oral argument"), 
Bennett v State, 302 Ark 179, 789 
SW2d 436, 438 (1990) (concludmg that 
statute, which read " When the evidence 
is concluded, the court shall, on motion of 
either party, instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case,' " was "so clear that 
it did not need interpretation" (citation 
omitted)), Little v State, 230 GaApp 
803, 498 SE2d 284, 287 (1998) (noting 
that in light of statute that provided that 
"the trial court shall instruct the jury in the 
law after the closing arguments are 
completed," preliminary instructions could 
not "serve as a substitute for a complete 
jury charge, as the statute requires, after 
the evidence is closed and arguments 
concluded" (quotations and citations 
omitted)), State v Comen, 50 Ohio St 3d 
206, 553 N E 2 d 640, 644 (1990) (holding, 
under Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
that although trial court may give jury 
preliminary instructions, "[ajfter arguments 
are completed, [the] trial court must fully 
and completely give the jury all 
instructions which are relevant and 
necessary for the jury to weigh the 
evidence and discharge its duty as fact 
finder"), State v Nelson, 587 N W 2 d 
439, 444 (SD1998) (construing word 
"shall" as "a mandatory directive" in a 
statute that read " 'The court shall read its 
instructions to the jury' at the close of the 
evidence and before final argument" 
(citation omitted)) 
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FN7. Because we hold that the trial court's 
failure to reinstruct the jury violated rule 
17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, we do not address Defendant's 
argument that the trial court's failure to 
reinstruct the jury also violated his due 
process right to a fair trial. 
[13][14] 1f 27 Having determined that the trial 
court erred when it failed to repeat its preliminary 
jury instructions at the close of evidence, we must 
ascertain whether this error was harmful. In order 
for an error to be harmful, "the likelihood of a 
different outcome must be sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also 
Utah R.Crim. P. 30(a) ("Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."). 
^ 28 Based on our review of the record, we cannot 
say that had the trial court repeated the preliminary 
jury instructions at the close of evidence, the verdict 
in this case would have been any different. The 
time period separating the trial court's reading of the 
preliminary instructions from the close of evidence 
was less than twenty-four hours. Moreover, when 
the jurors retired to deliberate, they were provided 
with a written copy of every preliminary and final 
jury instruction. Finally, despite Defendant's 
assertions to the contrary, this case was not a close 
credibility contest over the issue of consent. Other 
than Defendant's testimony, all of the relevant 
evidence demonstrates that the victim engaged in 
sex against her will. The victim had known 
Defendant for less than half-an-hour. She 
immediately reported the incident to her boyfriend 
and told him and the security guard at Bricks 
nightclub that she had just been raped. Finally, the 
security guard confirmed that it appeared that the 
victim had recently been in "a scuffle" when he saw 
her and that she appeared to him to be extremely 
upset and emotional. 
f 29 Therefore, we conclude that although the 
trial court erred when it failed to reinstruct the jury 
at the close of evidence, this did not affect the jury's 
verdict. Accordingly, the trial court's error was 
harmless. 
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CONCLUSION 
\ 30 The reasonable doubt instruction that the trial 
court gave to the jury clearly did not comport with 
the first and third prongs of the three-part test as 
announced in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1232 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98,1} 25 n. 11, 61 P.3d 
1000. Although Robertson is not consistent with 
United States Supreme Court precedent, this court 
does not have the authority to overrule Robertson. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
TI 31 In addition, we conclude that the trial court 
violated rule 17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure when it failed to repeat those preliminary 
jury instructions that related to Defendant's 
fundamental rights. However, in light of the 
evidence in this case, the short time between the 
preliminary instructions and the close of evidence, 
and the fact that the jurors were provided with 
written copies of all of the jury instructions, we are 
confident that the trial court's error did not influence 
the jury verdict. Therefore, the trial court's error 
was harmless. 
*850 f 32 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH 
, Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS 
, Judge. 
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BURDEN OP PROOF 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, 
are in favor of innocence. A defendant is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Where you are satisfied that a reasonable doubt exists 
as to a defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to 
acquittal. 
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which 
is merely possible, since everything in human affairs is 
open to some possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that satisfies 
your mind and convinces your conscientious understanding. 
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men 
and women and arises from the evidence, or lack of 
evidence, in the case. 
